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Debt and Relief  
A holistic approach to the legal treatment of consumer debt 
 
Guido Comparato 1 
 
Abstract: The awareness that consumer over-indebtedness is a problem which needs to be 
tackled through specific measures most clearly emerged at the end of a period in which in-
creased availability of retail financial services was presented as a means to promote con-
sumers’ welfare. While, on the one hand, over-indebtedness is regarded as a problem to be 
counteracted, European law and policy, on the other hand, promote indebtedness, leading to 
a fragile equilibrium between opposing purposes which permeate the regulatory framework. 
How can the two objectives be reconciled, allowing for well-ordered development of a credit-
based economy in which debtors in financial trouble are not left behind? This paper suggests 
the necessity of taking a holistic approach to over-indebtedness, starting from the assumption 
that, rather than being the manifestation of individual inability to properly deal with finance, 
the phenomenon is inherent to a credit economy and that modern law must therefore tackle it 
systematically through a combination of measures: private and public, contractual and non-
contractual, preventive and curative, national and supranational. While articulating a cri-
tique of some of the rationales underlying ‘debt law’, the paper highlights the necessary in-
terrelation between the possible legal strategies against household over-indebtedness and the 
need to coordinate them in order to reach an adequate level of protection.  
 
Zusammenfassung: Die Wahrnehmung, dass Verbraucherüberschuldung ein nach spezifisch-
en Gegenmaßnahmen verlangendes Problem ist, tauchte deutlich am Ende einer Periode auf, 
in der der erleichterte Zugang zu Finanzdiensten als ein Instrument der Verbraucher-
wohlfahrt präsentiert wurde. Auf der einen Seite wird Überschuldung jetzt als ein zu 
bekämpfendes Problem betrachtet; auf der anderen Seite hat die Europarechtspolitik der 
letzten Jahre Verschuldung sogar befördert. Das führt zu einem instabilen Gleichgewicht 
zwischen sich womöglich widersprechenden gesetzlichen Zielen. Wie kann man diese zwei 
Ziele miteinander versöhnen und die Entwicklung einer Kreditökonomie ermöglichen, ohne 
dass Schuldner in Schwierigkeiten vergessen werden? Dieser Artikel suggeriert die Not-
wendigkeit eines holistischen Ansatzes zur Überschuldung, der davon ausgeht, dass das 
Phänomen in der Regel nicht das Resultat von individueller Unfähigkeit mit Geld umzugehen 
ist, sondern der Kreditökonomie inhärent ist. Es sollte deshalb systematisch durch eine Kom-
bination von rechtlichen Maßnahmen bekämpfen werden: privat und öffentlich, vertraglich 
und außervertraglich, präventiv und kurativ, national und supranational. Indem er einige der 
dem Recht der Schulden zugrundeliegenden Gedankengänge kritisiert, hebt der Artikel die 
Wechselwirkung zwischen möglichen Strategien gegen Haushaltüberschuldung hervor und 
betont die Notwendigkeit, sie zu koordinieren, um ein angemessenes Schutzniveau zu er-
reichen. 
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Resumé : La prise de conscience du fait que le surendettement du consommateur est un prob-
lème à affronter avec des mesures spécifiques s’est accrue à la fin d’une période où un accès 
plus aisé aux services financiers était vu comme un instrument pouvant accroitre le bien-être 
du consommateur. Tandis que le surendettement est considéré comme un problème qu’il faut 
combattre, la politique du droit européen promeut l’endettement. Dans le cadre réglemen-
taire, cela aboutit à un équilibre instable entre deux objectifs contradictoires. Comment peut-
on réconcilier les deux, en rendant ainsi possible le développement d’une économie du crédit 
où les débiteurs en difficulté ne sont pas abandonnés ? Cet article suggère qu’il est néces-
saire de choisir une approche holistique face au surendettement, basée sur le présupposé 
que, loin d’être la manifestation d’une incapacité individuelle de bien gérer son argent, le 
phénomène est inhérent à l’économie du credit. Par conséquent, le droit doit y faire face sys-
tématiquement par la combinaison de mesures différentes : privées et publiques, contrac-
tuelles et non-contractuelles, préventives et curatives, nationales et supranationales. Tout en 
présentant une critique de la logique qu’inspire le droit de la dette, cet article souligne les 
corrélations entre les possibles stratégies juridiques vis-à-vis du surendettement et la néces-
sité de les coordonner, afin d’atteindre un niveau adéquat de protection. 
 
 
Introduction 
The twentieth and twenty-first century policies of the ‘democratisation of finance’2 and of 
‘financial inclusion’3 encouraged a growing number of consumers to obtain credit and finan-
cial products on more accessible conditions,4 leading to more individuals incurring excessive 
debt and over- indebtedness. Yet, awareness of the problem of citizens’ over- indebtedness is 
not new. Instead, this has regularly emerged at various historical junctures,5 with correspond-
ing calls for public intervention. Notably in ancient Greek law, as well as Roman law, we 
find moratoria meant to set debtors free from their obligations,6 often motivated by public 
policy considerations relating not so much to macroeconomic risks - as the problem is often 
phrased nowadays - but rather in public order concerns, as the level of indebtedness put soci-
etal peace at risk. The concept of ‘Jubilee’, in its original biblical meaning of cyclical remis-
sion of sins and debts, is innately tied to the history or at least the mythology of debt. Those 
interventions of public relief compensated for the strictness of legal rules which did not easily 
allow for relief, as they safeguarded the interest of the creditor instead and resulted in severe 
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sanctions for the insolvent debtor with a view to uphold public confidence.7 Against that 
background, the strict formalism of private law could be maintained over the centuries only 
by permitting public interventions to act as a relief valve whenever the pressure caused by 
indebtedness became socially unsustainable: celebrated principles nowadays expressed in 
terms of Geld muss man haben and pacta sunt servanda, which suggest the image of an un-
compromising law, could thus dominate over contract law only inasmuch as public powers 
occasionally intervened ex machina to remedy the social problems codetermined by those 
very principles. While the regulation of commerce later allowed for mechanisms to orderly 
deal with commercial debt - yet characterised by a strong punitive approach ranging from 
imprisonment to loss of political rights of the debtor in continuity with the archaic attitude - 
the civil debtor remained exposed to the harshness of general principles even when the evolu-
tion of a consumer society magnified the problem of debt. The historical perspective reminds 
us, therefore, of the importance of looking at the legal treatment of debt in a comprehensive 
way, considering how different doctrines and measures interact, delineating the broader law 
and policy of debt. 
What is then the contemporary policy approach towards private debt? The approach of pri-
vate law, in particular European private law, to the issue appears to be marked by a twofold 
and possibly contradictory attitude. On the one hand, over- indebtedness is now widely recog-
nised as a problem to be counteracted;8 on the other hand, major economic and legal devel-
opments encourage the extension of debt for both economic and social goals, consistent with 
the ‘democratisation of finance’ policy.9 This twofold approach results in a particularly frag-
ile equilibrium between the different goals which permeate the regulatory framework.10 
While one would expect that private law, and typically contract law, can offer some solutions 
to over- indebtedness, inasmuch as it regulates the contractual source of debt, there remain 
serious doubts whether private law is an efficient instrument to that purpose: that branch of 
the law is mostly based on the idea of self-responsibility and of the private dimension of debt. 
But is this system sustainable, all the more considering what has been said in terms of the in-
terplay between strict private law rules and public measures occasionally offering debt relief? 
Against this framework and rooted in the notion that over-indebtedness is in fact inherent to a 
credit economy rather than deriving from necessarily isolated and morally repugnant individ-
ual behaviours, this contribution suggests the necessity of taking a more holistic approach to 
                                                 
7
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the problem. The paper offers a classification of the different strategies that may be deployed 
and highlights that an optimal approach must rely on a combination of measures, private and 
public, contractual and non-contractual, preventive and curative, national and supranational - 
intended as complementary rather than alternative to each other. While articulating a critique 
of some of the rationales underlying debt law, the paper emphasises the necessary interrela-
tion between the different legal measures and the need to coordinate them in order to reach an 
adequate level of debtor protection. A multifaceted phenomenon requires a multifaceted re-
sponse. The paper is structured as follows: the first section will introduce the phenomenon of 
household over- indebtedness and offer a classification of possible responses to it. The second 
part will focus on some of those responses, considering in particular those applicable to cases 
of over-indebtedness rooted in financial contracts, and highlighting their fundamental traits 
and potential. In the third part, the paper will look more closely at the interrelations between 
the previously introduced instruments. The conclusion summarises the main points of the 
contribution further rationalising the relation between instruments aimed at combatting 
household over- indebtedness. The approach of the paper is European in its broader sense, as 
it is mostly concerned with European law11 describing trends in Europe as a whole and draw-
ing from sources of both supranational and national law; needless to say, including the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Different approaches to debt and relief 
In the absence of a single, general legal definition of over- indebtedness, the phenomenon can 
be taken to mean the non-temporary condition of a debtor having greater debts than he can 
likely repay. This is further qualified as consumer, or household, over- indebtedness to refer 
to the amount of debt mainly contracted by a civil debtor and his or her family for reasons 
mainly falling outside the scope of his or her commercial or professional activity. The specif-
ic features and manifestations of over- indebtedness might then differ according to various 
contexts and countries. 12  Rather than defining or describing that phenomenon in general 
terms, it seems more important for our purposes to draw an initial distinction between sources 
and causes of over- indebtedness. Contracts can be said to be one of the ‘sources’ of indebt-
edness. Indebtedness as such is a rather generic term which conceives a plurality of debts 
stemming from a multitude of contracts and social interactions. Seen this way, indebtedness 
is a normal economic occurrence: a well- functioning economy simply could not operate 
without exchanges between individuals who take on the roles of creditors and debtors. Up to 
a certain extent, indebtedness is necessary, while policies intended to facilitate the develop-
ment of the credit market and of retail investments appear in fact as policies promoting in-
debtedness. Only when the debt stemming from particular sources becomes financially un-
sustainable, can we speak of over-indebtedness. In those circumstances, the focus must be 
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shifted from the source of debt, to the ‘cause’ which transforms indebtedness into over-
indebtedness.13 An individual might be indebted because he has concluded a mortgage con-
tract, but he will become over- indebted if he is unable to repay the loan because of, for in-
stance, supervening unemployment. In simplified terms, and using the well-known distinction 
elaborated by the Bank of France, the impossibility of repaying debts can derive either from 
financial recklessness – active over- indebtedness – or because of unforeseen causes of major 
force – passive over-indebtedness. Sociological and statistical data help us identify the most 
recurring sources and causes of over- indebtedness14 and it is now widely assumed that pas-
sive over- indebtedness plays a more prominent role, though the two dimensions are generally 
interlinked.15 The topic has been investigated for several decades, revealing a multidimen-
sional phenomenon, which involves a plurality of sources and causes often of a social 
origin. 16 Life events like illness, divorce, unemployment, increased costs of renting, 17  are 
among the main causes of over- indebtedness, which contradicts the popular idea that it is the 
‘moral’ fault of the debtor or at least to their ‘economic inadequacy’ that results in their de-
faulting on their obligations. But if that is true, is over-indebtedness mostly an issue of ‘social 
law’ to be taken care of by the welfare state rather than contract law? In fact, even if over-
indebtedness is triggered by an event, some specific contracts might expose individuals to an 
increased risk of over-indebtedness and to harsher social consequences than others: the case 
of payment arrears leading to foreclosures is infamous, and the rest of this contribution will 
in fact focus predominantly on banking and financial contracts; however it should be noted 
that even a default on utility bills can expose the debtor to the risk of both over-indebtedness 
and exclusion from fundamental services like heating and telecommunications.18 Indeed, sta-
tistics show the increasing significance of those expenses, together with tax debt, in the com-
position of household indebtedness.19 Thus, the very legal framework might not only repre-
sent a possible solution to the problem of over- indebtedness but, if poorly designed, directly 
contribute to the un sustainability of debt, to the point that it is justified to speak of a legal 
construction of over- indebtedness. What is, therefore, the legal framework applicable to over-
indebtedness? 
The introduction has already highlighted a historical correlation between private law princi-
ples upholding the debt and exceptional debt relief interventions grounded in a public or, at 
least, a non-contractual rationality. Building upon that relationship, it is noted that legal re-
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 Of course, from an etiological point of view, also the ‘source’ is a concomitant cause of over-indebtedness. 
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17 See Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen, iff-Überschuldungsreport 2018 Überschuldung in Deutschland 
18
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UK, Germany, Greece, and Italy (Eleven Publishing, 2016) 193 
19 Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen, iff-Überschuldungsreport 2018 Überschuldung in Deutschland, 25 
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sponses to (or, in a constructivist perspective, rather factor in) the problem can be based ei-
ther in contractual or non-contractual doctrines. The difference does not reside in the catego-
risation of an intervention as based on private or public law,20 the difference rather lies in the 
object of the intervention. Contractual instruments intervene on the contract, i.e. the source of 
the debt, while non-contractual instruments have a broader scope usually affecting the debt 
itself rather than its source. Moreover, there are two ways in which those two can operate, i.e. 
preventively or curatively, leading to a distinction between ex ante and ex post measures. 
These two categories intersect giving rise to four categories of legal responses: ex ante con-
tractual, ex ante non-contractual, ex post contractual, ex post non-contractual. Given the level 
of intricacy, the following scheme is meant to bring in some clarity to the issue and provide 
some obviously non-exhaustive examples of each doctrine - with a particular focus on finan-
cial transactions - several of which will be addressed in the following parts. 
 
 Ex ante Ex post 
Contractual Responsible lending and 
borrowing, 
Information duties, 
Know-your-customer, 
Product regulation 
Termination of contract 
(frustration, duress, 
mistake, statutory 
consumer protections…) 
Adjustment and re-
negotiation 
Non-contractual Financial supervision, 
Debt advice, 
Financial education 
Debt advice, 
Consumer insolvency 
 
 
As a further complication in the European framework,21 each of these instruments might re-
side at the supranational and/or at the national level - not to mention the almost certain possi-
bility of intersection and hybridisation of remedies stemming from different regulatory levels. 
Although it might appear that the choice for one or the other of the two regulatory levels is 
arbitrary, a peculiarity strikingly emerges from the above scheme, i.e. EU instruments have 
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 Leaving aside the question whether that distinction is in fact convincing. 
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so far focused on a mostly ex ante contractual dimension, while ex post non-contractual 
measures reside predominantly at the national level. The reason for this distribution is that, 
constrained by its institutional design, EU legislation has mostly viewed over- indebtedness as 
the downside of financial access and as a problem to be prevented; historically, referring this 
task to its member states.22 However, an evolution within the policy aims of the Union has 
occurred: since the issuing of the first Consumer Credit Directive,23  the Commission has 
funded several studies24 in order to get a clearer picture of a problem characterised by unclear 
and discordant definitions adopted at the level of the member states.25 Recognising a multi-
plicity of approaches, the European Commission mentioned instruments of both prevention 
and rehabilitation as possible measures against over- indebtedness.26 As early as in 2002, the 
Economic and Social Committee also formulated recommendations27 for member states and 
the European Commission, suggesting that a well- functioning internal market justified the 
harmonisation of both substantive and procedural rules. More recently, the Commission in-
vited the Member States ‘to explore the possibility of applying’ its recommendations on 
business insolvency procedures to consumers.28 
More outspoken and comprehensive guidance came from the Council of Europe, rather than 
the EU. Following-up on the 2005 resolution on ‘Seeking Legal Solutions to Debt Problems 
in a Credit Society’,29 the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation on legal solutions to 
debt problems30 which outlines a variety of routes, ranging from financial literacy to regula-
tion, to ‘mechanisms necessary to facilitate rehabilitation of over- indebted individuals and 
families and their reintegration into society’,31 such as the protection of the essential assets of 
                                                 
22
 See Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC, recital 26. 
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Mueller, E. Kempson, A. Atkinson, A. Finney, Towards a common operational European definition of over-
indebtedness (European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportuni-
ties Inclusion, Social Policy Aspects of Migration, Streamlining of Social Policies Unit, 2010). 
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Statistical Aspects Contract n°: B5-1000/00/000197, final report (Commission of European Union, 2001). 
26
 European Commission, Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, March 2009, 62-63 
27
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Household over-indebtedness, 2002/C 149/01 
28
 EU Recommendation of 12 March 2014 C(2014) 1500 final, recital 15 
29
 MJU-26 (2005) Resol. 1 Final. 
30
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)8. 
31
 Ibid., 4.  
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the debtor or measures ‘allowing partial or total discharge of the debts of individuals and, 
where applicable, families in cases of over-indebtedness where other measures have proved 
to be ineffective’,32 therefore interestingly hinting at a possible hierarchy of measures. 
Despite the extended range of options available, this catalogue deriving from a combination 
of national and supranational law does not represent a menu of practically equivalent options 
from which legislators and judges can arbitrarily choose their favoured meal. Rather, because 
of the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the phenomenon of over- indebtedness, an effective 
strategy will require a combination of all instruments, whose proper mixture will depend on 
the social and economic fabric of the specific context. The various routes will be now intro-
duced, starting from those which are more clearly meant to affect the debt itself rather than its 
source; hence we will first quickly touch upon non-contractual instrument and, after that, on 
contractual instruments. 
 
Non-contractual instruments 
 
Non-contractual instruments address over- indebtedness focusing on debt as an economic 
phenomenon, escaping the strictures of legal doctrines which rather focus on the regulation of 
the ‘source’ of the debt. This is not to say that non-contractual instruments are necessarily 
preferable. First, they also present limitations: from the perspective of the debtor, they are 
available after possibly lengthy and complex procedures and litigations, while from the per-
spective of the creditor they will irremediably lead to an economic loss. Second, even if non-
contractual measures affect the debt rather than the contract, they also entail consequences 
for the application of contract law doctrines, from which they cannot be detached completely, 
as will be shown in the second part.  
Currently, the two non-contractual instruments which have been discussed more extensively 
in the literature and which are being promoted in different countries through specific reforms, 
are programmes aimed at increasing the financial literacy of debtors and, additionally, per-
sonal insolvency procedures. 
 
Non-contractual ex ante instruments 
The OECD,33 the European Union,34 the Council of Europe, as well as the G20 High Level 
Principles on Financial Consumer Protection of 201135 have all stressed the importance of 
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 See the many working papers available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-
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improving the financial literacy of consumers implementing financial education programmes 
through public-private partnerships.36 The above-mentioned Council of Europe Recommen-
dation even suggested ‘financial literacy on the rights of consumers in general, and budget 
management in particular, as part of the national education system’.37 The core idea underly-
ing all these suggestions is, of course, that financially literate individuals will be able to take 
wiser decisions, while poor financial planning will likely lead into over- indebtedness. This 
reasoning is particularly widespread in the US where an extensive, though controversial,38 
literature documents a lack of literacy which leads consumers to take unfortunate financial 
decisions39 and that therefore might offer a justification for regulation.40 In the European con-
text, which has embraced financialisation only more recently, the expert group on financial 
education similarly recognised that ‘the kinds of problems experienced by European consum-
ers have shown that they need very basic skills and knowledge’. 41  Those skills and 
knowledge appear to be necessary to enhance the effectivity of the disclosure obligations 
which financial regulation already imposes on services providers: if the consumer is simply 
unable to fully comprehend the information provided, then the information paradigm which 
characterises much of financial regulation will be ineffective. That leads to the concern that 
the approach of European law, focused more on disclosure obligations than on promoting 
consumer financial literacy, might be unable to protect consumers from their own bad deci-
                                                                                                                                                       
34
 White Paper on Financial Services Policy COM(2005) 629. 2004 Green Paper on Retail Financial Services 
COM(2007) 226 2007 European Parliament resolution on financial services policy P6_TA-
PROV(2007)0338/A6-0248/2007, ECOFIN Council conclusions of 8 May 2007 
35
 G20 principles, 4 
36
 Second Meeting of the Expert Group on Financial Education, The financial crisis and financial education. 
Report, Brussels, 28th April 2009, 4. 
37
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)8, 2.b.  
38
 T.A. Durkin and G. Elliehausen, ‘Consumer Lending’, in Handbook of Banking, 312-325, 316; B. Bucks and 
K. Pence, ‘Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms?’ (2008) 62 Journal of Urban 
Economics 57-70 ; G. Donadio and A. Lehnert, ‘Residential Mortgages’, in Handbook of Banking 336 
39
 D. Bernheim, ‘Do households appreciate their financial vulnerabilities? An analysis of actions, perceptions, 
and public policy’ (1995) Tax Policy and Economic Growth, American Council for Capital Formation, 1-30; in 
connection to the issue of overindebtedness, A. Lusardi and P. Tufano, ‘Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, 
and Overindebtedness’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, w. 14808, 2009. 
40
 An overview in J.Y. Campbell, H.E. Jackson, B.C.Madrian, P. Tufano, ‘The Regulation of Consumer Finan-
cial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies’, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series 
RWP 10-040, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, pp. 9-10 
41
 Second Meeting of the Expert Group on Financial Education, The financial crisis and financial education. 
Report, Brussels, 28th April 2009, 2. 
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sions.42 If this is true, Moloney suggests that ‘[t]he resources expended on empowering inves-
tors, particularly on the disclosure side, are likely to be misapplied without supporting educa-
tion strategies’.43 Legislation has followed suit and the 2014 Mortgage Credit Directive en-
couraged Member States to ‘promote measures that support the education of consumers in 
relation to responsible borrowing and debt management, in particular in relation to mortgage 
credit agreements’, while the Commission undertakes to assess those measures identifying a 
set of best practices.44 If financial information appears to be too difficult to be understood by 
the average consumer, after having tried to improve the information, the legislator now aims 
at improving the consumers’ knowledge and comprehension. 
Despite this emphasis, the role of financial literacy should not be overestimated. In the first 
place, some consumer rights advocates ‘believe that it is not the consumer who should adapt 
to the financial system but the financial system that should adapt to consumer needs’,45 while 
a different and more limitative way of understanding financial education – which remains a 
broad notion which concretely manifests itself in very diverse forms46 – might lead to that 
paradigm shift. Moreover, the continuous and quite paternalistic references to the need to ed-
ucate consumers on how to manage money appear as the behaviouralist re-enactment of the 
reliance on the information paradigm, now reinforced by the newly emerged macroeconomic 
justification of achieving financial stability. As it rests upon the assumption that a more edu-
cated consumer will be able to take better care of his own interests, the policy of financial 
education appears as a possibly powerful tool to address the causes of active over-
indebtedness, but much less so in the case of passive one. In fact, while the focus of financial 
education programmes appears to be on the use of financial services, rather than on money 
management per se, it is therefore quite unlikely that this approach might be effective in 
helping with frequent causes of over-indebtedness such as illness or divorce. With this in 
mind, financial education alone cannot be considered as the only policy response to promote 
a more responsible financial market, not only because it might be not entirely effective, but 
also because it is ill-equipped to address a considerable part of the problem of over-
                                                 
42
 V. Mak and J. Braspenning, ‘Errare humanum est. Financial Literacy in European Consumer Credit Law’, 
TISCO Working Paper Series on Banking, Finance and Services, No. 01/2012, p. 5. 
43
 N. Moloney, How to Protect Investors. Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 389. 
44
 Directive 2014/17/EU, Art. 6 
45
 U. Reifner and A. Schelhowe (2010) ‘Financial Education’ 9 (2) Journal of Social Science Education 32 – 
42, 33 
46
 Ibid. 32 – 42 
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indebtedness. This aspect has been touched upon also by the expert group on financial educa-
tion, remarking that financial education cannot be regarded as a substitute for regulation.47  
 
Non-contractual ex post instruments 
Emergency measures both at the EU and the national levels have attempted to tackle the sys-
temic problem posed by excessive indebtedness of banks. With regard to household over-
indebtedness, several countries have amended their legislation in order to introduce new and 
exceptional mechanisms to cope with consumer debt. This represented a significant event as 
those procedures were generally reserved to commercial debtors based on the assumption that 
only commercial insolvencies posed a systemic risk to the economy and, as such, justified 
specific procedures taking into account the interests of all creditors.48 Though mechanisms of 
consumer bankruptcy emerged in the 80s,49 it is noteworthy that the financial and economic 
crisis has led to an acceleration and spread of those models, producing a second wave of per-
sonal bankruptcy legislation in Europe. One could mention, quite paradigmatically, the law 
reforms which took place in Greece in 2010, in 2011 in Iceland,50 as well as in 2012 when 
consumer bankruptcy laws were either introduced or reformed in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and 
Ireland. Although in some instances the necessity of introducing personal insolvency regimes 
was recognised in the early 2000s, when different financial scandals produced significant 
losses for retail investors,51 the legislative lag resulted from political reasons and, more fun-
damentally, the particular economic fabric of those societies, in which household indebted-
ness traditionally played a less prominent role than private saving. The necessity of debt re-
lief mechanisms for civil debtors was felt less urgently than in countries with a more wide-
spread financial retail system. Quite understandably, crisis-hit countries, which had to quick-
ly introduce emergency measures, tended to adopt the most far reaching ex post non-
contractual instruments, such as personal insolvency, rather than preventive measures. 
These systems include, most importantly, debt adjustment or debt discharge procedures, ei-
ther judicial or extra-judicial or more often a combination of both. Solutions in this regard are 
quite diverse and well documented in an already rich literature.52 It suffices to recall that, be-
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sides the plurality of solutions elaborated and which to a certain extent appear to respond to 
different political economic views,53 at least in Europe one can identify some common fea-
tures in these schemes. We will return to some of these features in the following pages, but 
first it will be necessary to shift the focus from the instruments through which the debt is 
tackled to those instruments which intervene on the source of the debt itself. 
  
Contractual instruments 
European contract law lacks a single, general doctrine to address over- indebtedness. The rea-
sons for this are historical and inherent to the very concept of a contract as an economic 
transaction. The system of private law values the principle of self- responsibility as a manifes-
tation of private autonomy, which holds particularly true with respect to the economic con-
tents of the contract. The issue which needs to be corrected by law does not lie in the exces-
sive debt itself, which is something that as a rule of thumb the law leaves to the contracting 
parties themselves to evaluate, but rather in its possibly unfair or non-consensual source. Ex-
ceptions tend to be rare and usually linked to situations which, where recognised, are so in-
vidious they can even amount to crimes, such as in the notable case of usury. Self-
responsibility remains the theoretical starting point even in the way in which the literature 
interprets those rules which can perform an anti-over- indebtedness function. Creditworthi-
ness assessment rules, as an example, are construed as a safeguard of the free will of the par-
ty, which on the other hand raises the question whether a lender has a duty to inform when-
ever a loan could negatively impact the quality of life of the borrower,54 or whether that duty 
has to be narrowly construed in light of the principle of self-responsibility.55 
Even if one accepted that one of the functions of contract law should be the preven-
tion or cure of over- indebtedness, nonetheless, this still does not imply that this branch of the 
law is sufficiently well-placed to attain that goal. The problem appears to be that, as over-
indebtedness is a dynamic process arising from a plurality of relations with several counter-
parts, contract law can mostly affect each of those relations individually. Unlike insolvency 
procedures characterised by their necessarily collective nature involving all creditors, con-
tract law is structurally unable to view over- indebtedness as a collective phenomenon. While 
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it is ill-placed to cope with the debt once it has arisen, since its ex post interventions are lim-
ited to its capacity to invalidate or amend existing contracts, contract law can nonetheless de-
termine the way in which debt arises, as the source of the monetary obligation. Interestingly, 
this aspect can both represent a constraint and offer room to manoeuvre: regulation of specif-
ic contract types might allow for more accurate fine-tuning to the necessity of the over-
indebted party. For instance, having found that one particular contract type is statistically 
more likely to lead to over-indebtedness - as obviously occurs with credit agreements - a 
stricter regulation of that agreement might reveal more effective than generic preventive rules 
indiscriminately affecting all contract types. Because of this, it is now convenient to focus 
mostly on some contracts only, i.e. banking and financial contracts, despite the fact that over-
indebtedness usually stems from very different contractual relations. In what ways, then, may 
contract law intervene? 
 
Contractual ex ante instruments 
Contract law can prevent over- indebtedness through at least two strategies. The first regulato-
ry one consists in setting restrictions to potentially dangerous obligations that parties can ne-
gotiate - examples include interest rate caps as well as regulation of the criteria through 
which interest is calculated, notably including the permission or prohibition of compound in-
terest. The second information-based approach consists in making contracting parties aware 
of the consequences that might derive from the contract, typically by way of information du-
ties backed either by sanctions or by a set of incentives and disincentives meant to produce 
the intended result (‘nudges’, as they are nicknamed in the behaviouralist perspective of ‘lib-
eral paternalism’).56 As touched upon, this latter approach is believed to be more likely to 
succeed when associated with financial literacy policies. EU contract law has traditionally 
favoured this strategy,57 but it is only in the aftermath of the financial crisis58 that the ap-
proach has gained teeth, with the expansion of the responsible lending principle in mortgage 
contracts.59 If the new rules on mortgage credit rest, in part, on a different rationale to the 
more liberal (and resulting from a compromise between opposite views)60 ones of the 2008 
Consumer Credit Directive, the difference appears justified by the further systemic and social 
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risk posed by mortgage debt. The choice for a regulatory or a liberal strategy appears, then, to 
be determined by considerations drawn from risk regulation which take into account the seri-
ousness of over-indebtedness. 
Forms of intrusive interventions on the contract itself, comparable to forms of product regula-
tion, have been less evident in the case of consumer credit where duties to inform have on the 
contrary been employed, while they are more developed with regard to retail investment 
products. The economic rationale underlying the reforms is evident comparing the three rele-
vant fields: responsible lending and know-your-customer obligations are particularly relaxed 
in the case of consumer credit, stricter in the case of mortgages (which can entail conse-
quences such as evictions) and particularly intrusive in the case of investment products 
(which can be detrimental both to the consumer and the financial system). Following this 
reading, systemic risk represents one of the considerations behind policy choices regarding 
over-indebtedness. 
 
Contractual ex post instruments 
Once a detrimental contract has been entered into, despite all the preventive rules which have 
been mentioned, how to deal with the possibly excessive debt arising from it? While the 
above-described ex ante measures are mostly of an EU origin and their rationale is rooted in 
(various degrees of) financial regulation, there is much less from the supranational level in 
terms of ex post contractual instruments, which are largely based on general contract law and 
therefore a national competence all the more after the unsuccessful codification attempts at 
the EU level. Nevertheless, even doctrines based on EU law have been used to seek relief for 
excessively indebted consumers, as the case of the Unfair Terms Directive abundantly and 
paradigmatically demonstrates:61 while it embodies principles which make it unfit to chal-
lenge terms leading to over- indebtedness if they are not also unfair62 and does not straight-
forwardly help against core terms, the directive, occasionally read in light of fundamental 
rights, has helped triggering through the Court of Justice of the EU a reform of national pro-
cedural mechanisms to the avail of over-indebted consumers, proving the relevance of con-
tract law even for designing effective non-contractual instruments. Leaving aside the well-
known events following the celebrated Aziz case63 and rather looking at national law, it is 
noted that in the wave of cases linked to the financial crisis, the doctrines which have been 
employed or tested - even if not always successfully - by the judiciary include good faith in 
continental Europe, (the lack of) causa specifically in Romance systems, as well as equitable 
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doctrines such as undue influence in English law.64 All those doctrines allow for the invalida-
tion of an agreement because of a flaw in the contract design or in the negotiation phase, thus 
for causes which can be considered endogenous to the contractual relation itself, temporarily 
prior or concomitant to it. As such, they focus on ‘sources’ but are less capable to catch the 
‘cause’ of over-indebtedness as directly linked to exogenous and supervening phenomena. 
The most notable exception, which has in fact been discussed in literature as a possible con-
tractual alternative to other instruments against over- indebtedness, is the ‘change of circum-
stances’ or ‘frustration’ doctrine, as an expression of an overarching rebus sic stantibus prin-
ciple.65 As is well-known, the principle, legislatively or doctrinally accepted in most coun-
tries even though with differences,66 allows for a contract to be terminated or amended when 
there has been a fundamental change of circumstances such that presumably the parties 
would have not agreed to the terms had they known in advance of that circumstance.  
Hence, while previously discussed policies like financial literacy seem to predominantly ad-
dress active over- indebtedness, the fact that change of circumstances involves an external and 
unforeseen event makes that doctrine theoretically appealing as an instrument to address pas-
sive and thus non-negligent over- indebtedness. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it allows for a de-
viation from the pacta sunt servanda principle, the doctrine is subjected to strict qualifica-
tions in most jurisdictions, so that its application to situations involving over- indebtedness - 
at least one stemming mostly from financial contracts - is often virtually excluded. The major 
obstacle to the application of the principle is the requirement that the event leading to the 
change of circumstances be exogenous to the conduct of the parties, unforeseen and unfore-
seeable - an ‘act of God’ in the traditional common law terminology - unforeseen and unfore-
seeable, even if different jurisdictions have shown different sensibilities on the evaluation of 
that unforeseeability. Could the ‘cause’ of over-indebtedness be foreseen? If active over-
indebtedness is necessarily excluded by this requirement, the fundamental question becomes 
whether passive over- indebtedness determined by event such as economic and debt crises 
could on the contrary be embraced by the doctrine, considering the crisis as an overwhelming 
and unforeseeable factor which makes the performance of the contract according to the origi-
nal terms impossible. Hence, foreseeability should concern the event leading to over-
indebtedness rather than over-indebtedness itself.  
This is not a purely theoretical question, as on the contrary the possibility of invalidating re-
tail investment and credit contracts in reason of the recession has been tried in several coun-
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tries but rarely has it led to beneficial consequences for indebted consumers except than in 
the remarkable case of Portugal. There, a swap contract was terminated because the financial 
crisis was controversially considered by the Court ‘in no way foreseeable’,67 making the con-
tract contrary to the requirement of good faith. A later comparative analysis focused on the 
facts of the Portuguese case confirmed that such an approach is unlikely to be effective in any 
other European country, so that the Portuguese solution appears more like a debatable excep-
tion than a viable alternative.68 Broadening our view, the same seems to hold true in the 
American common law, where courts have also denied that the recession allows a borrower 
to delay the payment of monthly instalments due under commercial contracts.69 Only in Nor-
dic jurisdictions, a form of ‘social force majeure’ has been long recognised expanding on the 
traditionally restrictive approach to change of circumstances, as an instrument which might 
help indebted debtors in trouble to be released from excessive debts.70 
Thus, are ex post contractual instruments of little or no use in the fight against house-
hold over- indebtedness? Not necessarily. If it is true that the judicial practice is almost uni-
versally restrictive, a certain interpretative leeway might still exist: in order to apply the doc-
trine of change of circumstances, the distinction between the source and the cause of over-
indebtedness which has been drawn earlier becomes crucial and has not always been suffi-
ciently considered in judicial applications. With regard to the ‘sources’ of over-indebtedness, 
the principle of rebus sic stantibus is not relevant to all contractual relations: application is 
limited to contracts which are not of an aleatory nature, which almost constantly excludes 
derivative contracts71 - but does not rule out other contract types. With regard to the ‘source’ 
of over- indebtedness, and thus the events leading to the change of circumstances, this limita-
tive approach taken by interpreters and courts who insist that a financial crisis is not an un-
foreseeable event seems problematic. To be sure, economists have shown that financial crises 
can be expected and are to a certain extent even unavoidable72 - which would make it more 
arduous to consider them completely unforeseeable in a legal perspective - but a very differ-
ent task is to foresee when and how a crisis will occur impacting on private relations. More 
importantly still, the financial crisis is just one of the elements of a series of events which can 
lead to worsened macroeconomic circumstances and thus to a change of circumstances. Even 
accepting that a financial crisis can be theoretically foreseen, less foreseeable might be the 
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further consequences in terms of ‘economic crisis’, possibly deriving from a combination of 
elements such as the financial crisis itself, economic recession, inappropriate political re-
sponses to it, unemployment and wage cuts and so on, which in the end result in the impossi-
bility of repaying debts. 
 It is worth noting that this line of reasoning already has received some judicial favour 
in commercial cases. In Spain, the Supreme Court stretched the traditionally limited approach 
to change of circumstances, admitting that the economic crisis might legitimise the applica-
tion of the doctrine, also referring to transnational private law as evidence supporting the new 
approach.73 More recently, and confirming its approach taken in 2013, the Court stated that 
‘the current economic crisis, with deep and prolonged effects of economic recession, can 
plainly be regarded as an economic phenomenon capable to determine a serious disturbance 
or change of circumstances’.74 In the light of this, the Court admitted the renegotiation of the 
economic contents of an advertisement contract - thus, importantly, not an aleatory one - after 
the economic crisis led to severe losses for one of the parties, which lost a considerable part 
of its usual business. The Court attempted to play down the novelty and potential theoretical 
implications of its decision by underlining that this reasoning does not represent a breach of 
the pacta sunt servanda principle but is rather coherent with the principles of commutative 
justice and good faith – which incidentally leads to the question whether the same approach 
could successfully be employed in jurisdiction where the principle of good faith appears to 
play a less prominent role.  
 
The interrelation among the instruments 
Confronted with this plurality of options available to counteract consumer over-indebtedness, 
the question might arise as to what is the optimal approach. That is not a question that can be 
answered in the abstract. First, each instrument has to be considered against the background 
of economic and social policy: depending on the particular social fabric, the law may favour 
preventive contractual instruments, which limit the availability of financial products to citi-
zens, or curative non-contractual measures, which relieve debtors resulting in losses for 
creditors. At least in part, the solution depends on the answer to another question, i.e. what is 
the trade-off between debtor protection and losses that the creditor can and should bear? That 
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is ultimately the reason why the original question as to what instruments are preferable can-
not be answered once and for all, as it involves political economic considerations which ap-
pear to be too context-dependent. A tentative answer will have to be left to another occasion, 
keeping in mind that all measures against over- indebtedness come with a cost that must be 
allocated. Second, the various instruments are not interchangeable; rather, they are interrelat-
ed, so that their use will necessarily reflect on the applicability of other measures. To put this 
interrelation more clearly by way of an example: it has been mentioned that stricter preven-
tive rules characterised by a stronger regulatory approach are employed in the case of finan-
cial services. This regulatory choice is made more compelling by the fact that, if over-
indebtedness were to arise as a consequence of the conclusion of a derivative contract, it 
would be nearly impossible to resort to curative measures such as the change of circumstanc-
es doctrine, in light of the above-mentioned limitations. Those transactions present a double 
level of risk (at least for the debtor): a financial risk and a legal risk, since the number of op-
tions available to help the over- indebted customer would be limited. The overall deficiency 
of general contract law in its ex post functionality must therefore be compensated by the 
stronger ex ante approach to certain financial transactions. The difficulty of applying a class 
of instruments puts pressure on the other available instruments. Conversely, this balance re-
quires that whenever product regulation is weaker, i.e. in the case of credit and less so mort-
gage credit but also in the case of non-financial contracts, legal responses must become 
stronger ex post - in fact, some limitations to the change of circumstances doctrine would not 
be an obstacle to the invalidation of non-aleatory contracts. Normatively, it could even be 
imagined that the rebus sic stantibus principle could be interpreted somewhat more generous-
ly in cases of passive over-indebtedness determined by consumer and mortgage credit con-
tracts, as those agreements are shielded by less stringent ex ante instruments. 
Other interrelations between ex ante and ex post instruments remain nonetheless more prob-
lematic and financial literacy measures, in particular, impact on the application of ex post 
measures. In the next three sections, different modes of interrelation between the measures 
will be sketched. 
 
Contract law and financial literacy 
The ruling of the Portuguese Supreme Court allowing for the termination of a swap contract 
frustrated by a change of circumstances has already been mentioned as an instance of appli-
cation of an ex post contractual measure. At the same time, that ruling has been criticised on 
doctrinal grounds because of its debatable interpretation of notions of foreseeability and risk. 
To be fair, and on a second glance at the Portuguese case-law, the judgment did not lead to a 
generalised extension of the applicability of change of circumstances to risky financial prod-
ucts beyond the case of the protection of a financially illiterate citizen. Lower courts appear 
to still adopt a restrictive approach in considering the foreseeability of financial crises,75 lead-
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ing to frictions with the approach of the Supreme Court.76 It makes sense, however, to go be-
yond the dogmatic analysis of the ratio of the decision and rather focus on the facts of the 
case, which are clearly and meaningfully outlined in the decision itself. As both the lower and 
the higher Portuguese court stated, clarifying the circumstances under which the contract was 
entered into, ‘the plaintiff merely limited herself to sign the contract and nothing was read to 
her or explained to her. The legal representative of the plaintiff is a very simple person, who 
just has a basic education and never contracted any special or complex financial product with 
banks, while the plaintiff never realised that the contract she was signing could entail any risk 
and, consequently, a considerable loss’. What emerges from this quote is primarily the inten-
tion to protect an unexperienced and unskilled user of financial services who, even without 
necessary qualifying as a consumer, completely lacked any financial literacy. This supports 
the intuition of Momberg that, rather than change of circumstances, ‘the existence of intrinsic 
or legal information duties, the complexity of the financial products and the (non-) sophisti-
cation of the client appear to be the main factors on which legal doctrine and the courts have 
relied to award damages or to terminate swap contracts’.77  
This is a telling aspect if placed into a comparative perspective: the way in which the Portu-
guese Court construed the investor as an inexpert subject is in fact not dissimilar to the ap-
proach taken by many other European courts to allow for the application of different doc-
trines, even including constitutional provisions,78 to the benefit of the weaker party. Whereas 
it remains very debatable whether a subjective element such as the lack of expertise of the 
investor can be usefully employed to interpret the objective element of the foreseeability of 
an event such as a financial crisis, that lack of expertise has in fact played a role in the appli-
cation of other doctrines. By these lights, while the Portuguese decision might be surprising 
to the extent that it applied change of circumstances to a derivative contract, it is by no means 
exceptional taking the different perspective of financially weaker party protection. The main 
question therefore shifts from the doctrinal correctness of resorting to change of circumstanc-
es (an analysis which would necessarily have to be based on the particular national legal cat-
egories) to the more fundamental issue of under which conditions and to what degree finan-
cial literacy should be taken into account while protecting the debtor.  
Financial illiteracy is often used as a concomitant argument to invalidate contracts based on 
several doctrines,79 while courts appear to be much less responsive to the complaints of fi-
nancially educated and sophisticated claimants. When the claimant is a sophisticated investor 
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and an advisory relationship has not been explicitly entered into by the parties, English courts 
usually refrain from concluding that there has been a breach of a duty of care or that the con-
tract can be rescinded for mistake,80 sometimes and controversially even forcing protective 
statutory provisions,81 whereas radically different outcomes can be reached when that level of 
sophistication is not present and the plaintiff appears to be ‘very naive and inexperienced 
about money matters’.82 The approach of continental courts especially in countries most af-
fected by the crisis appears to be sensitive to the degree of financial literacy of the claimant 
as well, as has become visible in a recent case-law concerning the miss-selling of harmful 
financial products to retail investors. As shown by Della Negra’s comparative analysis on the 
subject,83 the Spanish Supreme Court on different occasions refused to terminate for mistake 
a retail investment contract concluded by an experienced investor who appeared to have un-
derstood the risk assumed, while it acknowledged that a similar contract concluded by a small 
firm whose director lacked financial expertise could be terminated for mistake as the bank 
did not perform suitability and appropriateness tests as required by regulations.84 Rather than 
the formal qualification of a party as a ‘consumer’, what matters here is the degree of finan-
cial literacy, so that the ‘financial consumer’ appears to be different from the ‘consumer’ 
tout-court. That comparative analysis also points out that French courts undertake similar as-
sessments as to the concrete capacity of the investor to understand the risks associated with 
the contract they are signing, concluding that clients who are familiar with financial products 
because of their own trade or profession might be regarded as having a sufficient financial 
expertise to understand the contract.85  
Without repeating points already developed in those analyses, it suffices to note that while 
the concretely applicable doctrine can vary in different jurisdictions, financial illiteracy al-
ways comes into the picture as an element which delineates the figure of the weaker investor. 
What is much less considered is the question as to how the envisaged programmes of finan-
cial education might impact on legal reasoning and on the applicability of contract law doc-
trines and benchmarks such as the reasonably circumspect consumer. There is in fact an al-
ternative and less optimistic reading of the interaction between financial literacy and contract 
law: besides more general policy concerns that programmes of financial literacy ‘from above’ 
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in fact have a de-politicising effect on finance,86 one could also wonder whether the outlined 
approach of European national courts could still be employed when more widespread pro-
grammes of financial education would place the investor, at least formally, on the same in-
formational level as the financial services provider. Would that consumer still be protected as 
‘financially illiterate’? The further risk arises that, in defining the level of financial literacy of 
the retail investor, the mere fact that he has been financially educated might be sufficient to 
qualify him as financially literate, thereby depriving him of that protection which could oth-
erwise be offered by general doctrines. 
Hence, the still unfolding relation between financial literacy and contract law can be evaluat-
ed in two opposite ways. As a first possibility, a more informed consumer will not end up in 
over- indebtedness so that there will not be the need for ex post contractual and non-
contractual instruments. This is the optimistic view supported by the European Commission, 
which considers that financially literate individuals ‘are less likely to purchase products they 
do not need, be tied into products that they do not understand, or take risks that could drive 
them into financial difficulty’.87 In this sense, the strict approach of contract law with regard 
to doctrines like the change of circumstances will remain socially sustainable as financial ed-
ucation intervenes in the background. As a second and a less favourable scenario for consum-
ers, over- indebted individuals who have nonetheless been at least formally financially edu-
cated might encounter increased difficulties in being relieved through ex post contractual 
measures. In order to avoid counterproductive effects, the evaluation of literacy will have to 
be performed on an individual and concrete basis rather than in abstract relying on, for exam-
ple, the mere attendance of financial literacy programmes possibly introduced in schools as is 
being internationally advocated as a panacea. 
 
Financial literacy and personal insolvency 
 
An analogous concern to the one mentioned in the previous section regards the relation be-
tween financial literacy and personal insolvency procedures. An interesting characteristic of 
the legislation on the issue is that an over- indebted individual will be able to enjoy a so-called 
‘fresh start’ after a certain period of time at the end of the insolvency procedure only under 
certain conditions, which can notably include the requirement to follow financial literacy 
programmes. The most remarkable and outspoken example of this approach is offered by US 
law, where the much debated 2005 reform intended to limit the recourse to debt discharge 
required debtors seeking relief to follow a financial management instructional course. The 
idea is that ‘a financial management training curriculum and materials […] can be used to 
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educate debtors who are individuals on how to better manage their finances’.88 The policy 
rationale is that the reason why the debtor necessitated that procedure in the first place was 
poor capacity to manage their own finance, so that financial education will decrease the need 
of similar interventions in the future. This approach might be justified by the empirical find-
ing that, in the US, one consumer out of four still faced difficulties in paying their dues al-
ready one year after the conclusion of the debt relief procedure.89 At the same time, it might 
be wondered how much indebtedness is due to the lack of financial capacity of debtors who 
persist in bad management of their own finance, and how much depends on external factors 
over which the debtor has little or no control. In this sense, financial literacy possibly rein-
forces the idea of over- indebtedness as an active phenomenon downplaying the possible ex-
istence of structural reasons for indebtedness. 
Although not in the clear terms employed in America, financial literacy appears to play a role 
also in European consumer bankruptcy legislations.90 Here, nonetheless, rather than financial 
education per se as a preventive educative policy, legislation is more likely to refer to debt 
counselling and debt advice, more specific programmes which help already indebted con-
sumers to better deal with their deteriorating financial conditions. Because of the variety of 
debt counselling mechanisms existing in Europe, it is hard to identify some general features 
of those services, as they tend to be quite flexible in order to be able to support a debtor in 
different moments. As summarised by Niemi-Kiesilainen already at the end of the 90s, alt-
hough European consumer bankruptcy laws ‘do not usually explicitly require the debtor to 
receive counselling before filing for consumer bankruptcy’, they do require ‘the debtor to 
have made a good faith proposal to the creditors to settle the debts before filing for bankrupt-
cy. In practice, the legal requirements for an acceptable proposal are so complicated that the 
debtor needs professional assistance.’91 In some legislation on the subject, the role of those 
services has evolved into panels within public bodies conferred with a mandate to help the 
consumer elaborate a plan and support him during the procedure. This is the model now 
adopted by Italian legislation,92 which promotes the creation of ‘Crisis Settlement Boards’ 
with various functions including legal and financial advisor to the debtor. In several coun-
tries, the lack of independent debt advisers to help consumers in out-of-court procedures has 
been identified as a practical hindrance making it harder for individuals to have their debt 
dealt with effectively.93 
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It is worth noting that while policies of financial education might still not be optimal while 
combined with bankruptcy procedures, debt counselling services might on the contrary be 
more effective when employed immediately before debt becomes socially unsustainable and 
the debtor opts for the insolvency route. That appears to be particularly the case when debtors 
are in arrears and might face the risk of foreclosure. Attempting to set new guidelines that 
credit institutions should follow while dealing with debtors in trouble, the ‘Consumer Credit 
Sourcebook (CONC)’ by the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK states that whenever a 
debtor appears to be in arrears, the firm should inform the consumer, as part of its obligation 
to treat him fairly, that ‘free and impartial debt advice is available from not- for-profit debt 
advice bodies’ and direct him to those bodies.94 
 
 
Personal insolvency and contract law 
 
Because of a series of fundamental differences which have been tentatively explained both on 
economic and cultural grounds,95 the European approach to ex post non-contractual mecha-
nisms seems less extensive than the one of the US. If those procedures are examined taking 
into account also the contractual background of indebtedness, a further multiplication of ob-
stacles to debt relief seems to emerge. Legislators admit only good faith debtors for the dis-
charge of debts. The case of consumer and mortgage credit can be taken here as an example: 
the mortgage debtor applying for debt relief will have to be screened for her worthiness 
twice: initially by the financial services provider before credit is given, as part of the preven-
tive responsible lending measures, and secondly by a judge - or possibly by governmental 
insolvency services - when the ex post procedure is resorted to (the concrete moment in 
which this screening will be performed of course depends on the design of the particular 
law). As an example of the problems posed by this interaction we can consider Italy, a coun-
try which, as already mentioned, introduced consumer bankruptcy legislation after long dis-
cussions in 2012 under the pressure of the financial crisis.96 The law contains several refer-
ences to the general regime regulating consumer credit, stating for instance that the consumer 
plan of debt adjustment can pose limitations on the use of financial services by the debtor. 
More importantly, the law establishes that debt relief can be granted by a judge only after it 
has been ascertained that over- indebtedness does not derive from a negligent or dispropor-
tionate use of credit.97 Thus, the law obliges the judge to perform a kind of ‘debt relief wor-
thiness assessment’ which somewhat resembles a belated credit worthiness assessment: it 
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would seem that the practical relevance of this latter provision on the disproportionate use of 
credit would be limited if an analogous assessment on credit worthiness had been performed 
ex ante by the financial services provider in compliance with his responsible lending obliga-
tions. The two assessments are nonetheless quite different and serve different purposes: the 
one performed by the prospective creditor aims at determining whether the customer will be 
able to fulfil her financial obligations, while the assessment performed by a judge only serves 
to investigate the reasons why the debtor did not fulfil those obligations, with a view to pre-
venting abuses by a bad faith debtor. It may easily occur that after having ‘passed’ the first 
assessment, as it appears reasonable that she will honour a debt, a debtor might fail the sec-
ond one because, despite having the financial means to fulfil the obligations, she is unable to 
pay for some other reason or because, taking a broader view of her whole financial situation, 
a judge deems the consumer’s use of credit disproportionate. As such, this multiplication of 
assessments appears to play the legitimate role of avoiding abuses of the system, although it 
might open the door to arbitrary considerations of what proper economic behaviour should 
be. 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that both assessments are designed to detect debtor bad 
faith, while creditor bad faith does not attract the same level of attention: it is after all well-
known that borrowing- lending obligations are in fact mostly framed as responsible borrowing 
obligations.98 This imbalance, with the possibility that it overlooks a creditor’s bad faith, is 
likely to lead to problems, which was indeed evident in the very first judicial decision apply-
ing the new law in Italy.99 In that case, a creditor appealed against the approval of the debt 
adjustment plan, claiming that the debtor did not in fact deserve debt discharge as he was 
aware of his financial difficulties at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Leaving aside 
the specific facts of the case, it emerges that this mechanism might paradoxically allow for 
this claim to be made by the same subject who, possibly knowing about the economically un-
sound situation of the consumer, should have reasonably refused giving credit in the first 
place. As a result, a bad faith debtor who has concealed his or her deteriorated financial status 
will not benefit from the law, unlike a bad faith creditor who knew about the debtor’s situa-
tion and nonetheless extended the credit. This controversial situation, which opens the door to 
opportunistic behaviour and a ‘short-circuit’ of the debt relief system100 which is already at-
tracting legislative attention intended to sanction negligent creditors,101 derives from the inef-
fectiveness of ex ante rules on responsible lending and their lack of coordination with ex post 
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measures. Those latter measures become more stringent when ex ante mechanisms are not 
sufficiently developed. This is in fact paradoxical, since it is exactly the consumer who has 
not been screened in the first place who is more likely to end up over- indebted and therefore 
more in need of a debt relief.  
While a lack of coordination between different doctrines might lead to controversial out-
comes, it should be incidentally noticed that this is not only due to a technically flawed de-
sign, but more fundamentally to the persistence of a view of over- indebtedness as the main 
responsibility of the debtor rather than that of the creditor, despite the recurring suggestion in 
international literature that regulation should place a heavier burden on the credit industry 
sanctioning operators who take advantage of weak consumers.102 Again, the lesson is that 
over- indebtedness should be viewed as inherent to the credit economy, rather than as isolated 
and morally repugnant individual behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
While rising levels of consumer and household indebtedness have become a concern in most 
countries during the debt crisis, the European regulatory infrastructure became characterised 
by a complicated balance between the hardly reconcilable goals of promoting indebtedness 
on the one hand and of counteracting over- indebtedness on the other hand. As policies of fi-
nancial inclusion attempt to make financial services more accessible to consumers, the likeli-
hood that the latter will face debt problems has also augmented, especially if access to those 
services is not counterbalanced by appropriate measures meant to ensure protection. Against 
this background, over- indebtedness plainly emerges as an offshoot of the credit economy, 
and requires appropriate forms of regulation. Nevertheless, the difficulty in drawing a clear-
cut distinction between the two phenomena of indebtedness and over- indebtedness, together 
with the relative indifference of traditional private law to the problems of a debtor and to the 
‘causes’ leading to the impossibility of repaying a debt, poses several problems hampering 
the development of one coherent strategy to address the phenomenon. If there cannot be one 
single and overall doctrine to solve the problem, a plurality of mechanisms to cope with the 
negative repercussions of the promoted indebtedness appears on the contrary required. Dif-
ferent strategies can be deployed, ranging from financial education, to the employment of 
contract law doctrines to invalidate excessively onerous contracts, to consumer insolvency 
regimes. This paper has evidenced that those instruments are not functionally equivalent op-
tions, but are rather complementary: considering the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon 
of over- indebtedness, a combination of both preventive and curative, as well as contractual 
and non-contractual measures is necessary. As legal systems lack one of those instruments, 
the others will have to play a more significant role in practice, occasionally even stretching 
the borders of juridical notions. A quick look at legal evolution in fact reveals that the law of 
debt has always relied on a combination of public and private instruments to deal with debt 
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problems of individuals, as the strict approach of contract law to monetary obligations was 
attenuated by exceptional moratoria, discharge mechanisms, or even the welfare state. 
This has two implications: in the first place, and with respect to comparative research, focus-
ing only on the way in which a particular remedy works in different jurisdictions might offer 
a partial and misleading picture of the way in which over- indebtedness is dealt with in that 
legal and social order at large, if one does not also consider the significance of other 
measures. For instance, and in the sole perspective of debtor protection, a lax supervisory 
system might be slightly less inappropriate if on the other hand indebted consumers have eas-
ier access to debt discharge. Even more fundamentally, although not the specific focus of this 
contribution, the lack of welfare-state mechanisms to alleviate social vulnerability is likely to 
increase the risk of over- indebtedness, particularly given the labour market is increasing 
characterised by processes of workforce casualisation, which make individuals more vulnera-
ble to unexpected economic difficulties.  
Secondly, the fact that there is an interrelation between ex ante and ex post measures should 
not lead us to downplay the risk that some measures are employed for achieving objectives 
that would be more efficiently or more correctly achieved through different means. Associat-
ed with financial regulation, new ex-ante mechanisms have been implemented in particular 
with regard to banking and financial contracts, but over-indebtedness rooted in other contrac-
tual relations regrettably appears to be less regulated by appropriate preventive rules. At the 
same time, although ex-post instruments can relieve ex-ante mechanisms from part of the 
pressure of counteracting over- indebtedness, they also tend to be more bothersome for both 
creditors and debtors, and could therefore be better employed as a last resort, as also suggest-
ed by the Council of Europe. 
The choice for preventive, curative, contractual or non-contractual strategies to tackle the 
problem of over- indebtedness is not value-free and there is in principle no best approach, as 
long as a well-functioning interplay between curative and preventive measures is ensured. 
